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Introduction
This paper aims to investigate the idea of self in its relation to the Buddhist perception of suffering. Also, the notion of objectual and intentional properties will be briefly discussed.
The Talk of Persons as Useful Fiction
Buddhism, being a significantly variegated and complex religious and philosophical movement, comprises numerous varieties, which have different interpretations of the core questions of philosophy. Sauchelli observes that Siderits has introduced his perspective on Buddhist reductionism (BR) in his works (1273). BR is one of the numerous branches of Buddhism, and, for this paper, it is essential to dwelling upon the BRs interpretation of the idea of a person. The complexity of this question is pointed out by Hayashi since he observes that there are no persons in our final ontology, but there are persons in our conventional ontology according to Buddhism (1218). What is implied by this assertion?
To explain the notion of self in Buddhist reductionism, Siderits firstly proposes an example of how we talk about queue ( Freedom, Caring, and Buddhist Philosophy 99). He observes that it is a lot easier to use a single word for a line of people than to enumerate each of them, and thus we use this word in such a situation (Siderits, Freedom, Caring and Buddhist Philosophy 99). However, it is evident that the queue is only conventionally real because the word itself is a mere reference to a group of people, which are ultimately real (Siderits, Freedom, Caring and Buddhist Philosophy 99). In his other work, Siderits uses the water as an example of the same situation: we employ a single word, referring to a highly complex combination of different chemicals, to facilitate the communication ( Causation, Humean Causation and Emptiness 440). This assertion allows the author to explain the idea which serves as the basis for the concept of a person in Buddhist philosophy.
The term useful fiction is used by Siderits to explain the purpose of using the concept of person: a human being represents a causal series of psychophysical elements , which change over time, and thus there is nothing ultimately real about this complexity (fiction) ( Freedom, Caring and Buddhist Philosophy 99). However, for convenience, it is conventional to refer to this complex as person. Another important reason for such use of this notion is that it is easier to prevent suffering when the system of physical and psychological constituents is referred to with one word (Siderits, Freedom, Caring and Buddhist Philosophy 100).
Intentional and Objectual Properties
Additionally, it is possible to briefly touch upon the notions of intentional and objectual properties, which are two opposing aspects of the same idea. According to Churchlands explanation, any object has characteristics, which are its qualitative attributes of a different kind. However, these qualities could be attributed by the object itself (i. e. they exist regardless of human assumptions) in this case, it is an objectual property (Rosen et al. 426). On the contrary, an intentional property is a though-dependent quale, which is attributed to the object (Rosen et al. 426).
Conclusion
It is apparent from numerous studies that the concept of self, which was elaborated throughout the development of Buddhist philosophy, vastly differs from traditional assumptions about the essence of humanity in Western culture (Garfield et al. 293). This paper explained the core idea of the concept of self in Buddhist reductionism according to Siderits. Also, the brief observation of differences between objectual and intentional properties was provided.
Works Cited
Garfield, Jay L., et al. Ego, Egoism and the Impact of Religion on Ethical Experience: What a Paradoxical Consequence of Buddhist Culture Tells Us about Moral Psychology. The Journal of Ethics, vol. 19, no. 3, 2015, pp. 293-304.
Hayashi, Itsuki. Persons as Weakly Emergent: An Alternative Reading of Vasubandhus Ontology of Persons. Philosophy East and West, vol. 66, no. 4, 2016, pp. 1218-1230.
Rosen, Gideon, et al., editors. The Norton Introduction to Philosophy. WW Norton & Company, 2015.
Sauchelli, Andrea. Buddhist Reductionism, Fictionalism about the Self, and Buddhist Fictionalism. Philosophy East and West, vol. 66, no. 4, 2016, pp. 1273-1291.
Siderits, Mark. Causation, Humean Causation and Emptiness. Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 42, no. 4, 2014, pp. 433-449.
. Freedom, Caring and Buddhist Philosophy. Contemporary Buddhism, vol. 6, no. 2, 2005, pp. 87-116.
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